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The 1978 Hawaii Legislature· enacted comprehensive legislation 
authorizing and regulating the official ~lse of electrOIlic eavesdropping.) 
The preamble to the Act contains the finding that .U[ 0 ]rganized criminals 
make extensive use of wire communications in their criminal activities." 
For this reason, "[t]he interception of such communications to obtain 
evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an 
indispensable .aid to law enforcement and the administration of justlce."2 
The second purpose of the legislation is to safeguard the privacy of spoken 
c:ommunjc~tion: "[T]he interception of wire communications where none 
of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception 
should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent 
jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the 
authorizing court."11 
The Act generally prohibits the electronic surveillance of conversations, 
uppn pain of substantial criminal penalties,4 but permits law enforcement 
agencIes to conduct court-approved wiretapping when investigating 
specified criminal offenses.5 Applications for court authorization to 
wiretap must incl ude a showing of probable cause to believe that one of the 
specified offenses has been or is being commi tted, the identi ty of all known 
perpetrators of the offense, and a description of the communications 
sought to be intercepted.6 The court is required to conduct a secret but 
adversary hearing on the application, and may approve the wiretap if it 
finds probable cause concerning the offense and the likelihood that the 
wiretap will produce evidence of the offense, and that other means of 
crimin~l investigation are inadequate or impracticable in the case at 
hand.7 Court orders denying wiret'ap authorization are immediately 
appealable by the prosecution.s 
The court may authorize wiretapping for up to thirty days, and may 
approve fifteen-day extensions but only pursuant to new appliCations and 
fresh sets of probable cause firidings. 9 The court order must direct the 
wiretap agents to minimize the interception of communications not 
related to the purpose of the tap, to submit periodic reports to the court on 
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Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
objective. IO Wiretapped conversations must be recorded and made 
available to the court. 1l After the surveillance ends an inventory notice is 
given to all persons whose conversations were intercepted,12 and accused 
persons are entitled to have the court suppress unlawfully intercepted 
communications. 13 In addition, persons subjected to unlawful 
surveillance can recover civil damages of not less than $100 per day, but 
good faith reliance on a court order is a complete defense to civilliability.14 
Finally, the Act contains a "sunset" provision which self-terminates the 
entire legislation six years from the date of official approval, which was 
June 5, 1978.15 
Hawaii's wiretap law closely resembles its federal counterpart, which is 
commonly referred to as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968;16 however, the Hawaii legislation contains severa.! 
important privacy safeguards not found in the federal law. The P4rpose of 
this article is to describe and explain the salient provisions of the Hawaii 
Act, and to offer interpretive analysis of several such provisions through 
reference to judicial decisions that have construed textually similar 
sections of Title III and by analogizing pertinent concepts in conventional 
search and seizure law. 
Page 2 
Title III: The Federal Electroloic 
Eavesdropping Law 
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1967, Bergerv. New York 17 and 
Katz v. United States,18 set the stage for ,the passage of Title III. In Berger, 
the Court struck down as offensive to the fourth amend~ent's requirement 
of particularity in search warrants a New York eavesdrop law hut provided 
enough detail regarding that law's deficiencies to offer the beginnings of a 
blueprint for constitutionally valid electronic surveillance legislation. 19 
Katz disapproved a warrantless microphone surveillance of a telephone 
booth, and held squarely, for the first time, that electronic eavesdropping 
triggers the, fourth amendment's search warrant requirement even in the 
absence of a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area. 20 "The 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," observed Justice Stewart 
for the Court in Katz, and its protection im poses the req uirement of a court 
order in electronic surveillance cases. 21 The Katz decision also contained a 
significant dictum to the effect that court-approved surveillance of 
conversations would pass constitutional muster if it comported with the 
Berger criteria. 22 Six months later Congress adopted the suggestion and 
legitimated electronic surveillance in Title III. 
Title III not only establishes a 'comprehensive regulatory scheme for 
federal electronic surveillance activities but also sets minimum standards 
for state statutes. Section 2516(2) specifies that certain state officials may 
apply to a state court for an eavesdrop order if "authorized by a statute of 
that State," and that the judge may approve the order so long as his 
approval is "in conformity with" Title III and the applicable state statute. 
Title III thus served as a model for the Hawaii legislation, and many 
parallel sections' of thes~ two acts employ identical language. 
The Katz requirement of advance judicial authorization is the 
constitutional linchpin in both acts, and the procedures for court approval 
and specifications for contents of eavesdrop orders bear close resembla.nce. 
There are, however, important di.fferences. As the House committee report 
on the Haw,aji legislation points out: "The [Act] is similar to the portion 
of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as 
amended, relating to wire interception.. However, the [Act] incorporates 
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nlOst significant of these is the Hat prohibition in Hawaii of the practice 
known as "bugging," that is, the interception of oral communications by 
concealed microphones.24 Wiretapping, which is authorized by both acts, 
typica]]y involves the surreptitious monitoring of telephone conversations 
by means of electronic or mechanical devices connected to the telephone 
WIres. 
The prohibition of bugging was recommended by the Hawaii 
Commission on Crime in a comprehensive report on electronic 
surveillance submitted to the Hawaii Legislature in January, 1978.25 The 
crime commission observed that bugging, which is authorized by the 
federal statute, usual1y effects a greater invasion of privacy than does 
wiretapping, because the former typical1y necessilates surreptitious entry 
into premises to install a microphone,26 whereas "[ w ]iretapping can 
almost always be achieved by the use of telephone company faejlities at 
telephone company offices."27 Moreover, noted the commission, the 
statutory mandate that eavesdroppers minimize the monitoring of 
communications not properly subject to interception can be more 
effectively implemented in the wiretapping than in the buggingcontext.28 
This is because two-party telephone conversations tend to be more distinct 
and limited in duration and subject matter than the kind of dialogue that 
occurs in homes, offices or vehicles. Telephonic communication therefore 
lends itself to more selective monitoring, and selective monitoring is the 
aim of the minimization requirement.29 Another more obvious 
consideration is that persons suspecting that they are targeted for 
surveillance can curtail the use of the telephone but cannot easily 
determine the location of, a microphone.30 The bugging ban is thus 
consistent with the legislative aim of balancing privacy concerns against 
"the compel1ing social need to enforce the penal laws in the area of 
organized crime."31 
Title III permits forty-eight hours of surveil1ance without court 
approval in certain emergency situations involving organized crirne or 
national security;32 the Hawaii legislation, on the other hand, has no 
exception to the requirement that a wiretap be authorized in advance by a 
judge.33 Court approval under Title III is accomplished by means of an ex 
parte application to the court, as in the case 0f arrest and search warrants. 
In contrast, the Hawaii Act establishes an adversary hearing on the 
prosecution's wiretap application, with provision for a court-appointed' 
"challenger" attorney to oppose the application and thus protect the 
public interest in privacy.34 
The two acts are discussed comparatively throughout this article. The 
article examines application procedures for wiretap orders, content~_ of 
wiretap orders, court supervision of wiretaps, and the remedy of 
suppression of evidence. A pervasive characteristic of both acts is that they 
are restrictive in intent and choice of language. Speaking of Title' III, 
Justice White recently observed: "Congress legislated in considerable 
Page 4 
detail in providing for applications and orders authorizing wiretapping 
and evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that the statutory 
authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant 
the surreptitious interception of wire and oral ..:ommunications. "35 The 








The application for a court order for wiretapping in Hawaii must be 
submitted "to a circuit court judge, designated by the chief justice of the 
Hawaii supreme court, in the county where the interception is to' take 
place."36 Section 803-44 of the Act prescribes that the applicant be the state 
attorney general or the county prosecuting attorney, and deputy attorneys 
general or prosecutors may apply only when specifically designated and in 
the "absence or incapacity" of the principal law enforcement officer. As the 
House committee report observed, "The [Act] contemplates that the 
prosecuting attorney or attorney general would apply in person for the 
wiretap order."37 This reql1irement should be read in light of a recent 
Supreme Court decision interpreting a parallel provision in Title III. 
In U"lited States v. Giordano,38 the Supreme Court examined Title Ill's 
command that court applications be made only by the Attorney General or 
a "specially designated" Assistant Attorney Genera}39 in a case where the 
application, although bearing the name of an appropriately designated 
assistant, had not been reviewed or signed by that individual. Noting that 
the statute meant precisely what it said, the Court invalidated the 
surveillance that had been authorized pursuant to the defective application 
and ordered suppression of the wiretap evidence. The Court reasoned that 
Title III requires the "mature judgment of a particular, responsible' 
Department of Justice official ... as a critical precondition to anyjudici~l 
order," and that this condition was intended to centralize and to limit the 
wiretap authodty.40 
In thus giving effect to the restrictive intent of Title III, the Giordano 
Court had occasion to discuss state wiretap application procedures. The 
federal law explicitly authorizes wiretap applications by the "principal 
prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of 
any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute 
of that State:"41 This provision, observed the Court, was similarly intended 
by Congress to limit state eavesdropping activity. The Hawaii application 
limitation of Section 803-44 is therefore animated by Title III itself, and the 




applitability to interpretation of state law. In consequence, prosecutors 
can expect to be held to a strict standard of compliance with this part of the 
Act. 
Wiretapping in Hawaii will be limited to two classes of offenses: 
murder, kidnapping, or felony criminal property damage when it involves 
the danger of serious bodily injury; and certain other felony offenses, 
including extortion, selected bribery crimes, gambling and drug sales, 
when a showing of the involvement of organized crime in the particular 
offense can be made.42 The House committe report proclaimed: "Since the 
primary purpose of the [Act] is to fight organized crime, the [Act] requires 
that court-ordered wiretapping be allowed only in cases where organized 
crime is involved except for a few very serious offenses. "43 Because the Act 
defines organized crime as "any combination or conspiracy to engage in 
criminal activity,"44 however, this limitation may be largely illusory. 
Wiretapping would seldom be employed in any event against criminals 
who operate alone and presumably have little occasion to discuss' their 
crimes on the telephone. 
Although the Act contemplates wiretap investigations in cases 
involving "bribery of a juror, of a witness, or of a police officer," it does not 
authori~e wiretapping for bribery of public officials. This omission was 
thought appropriate by the Hawaii Commission on Crime to avoid the 
"abuse of wiretap power for political purposes. "45 The crime commission 
has recently reported that organized crime flourishes only where it forges a 
"linkage" with legitimate societal power centers.46 If this assertion has 
validity, then pursuit of organized crime's highest echelons would be aided 
by investigation of all relevant bribery offenses. Moreover, the potential for 
executive abuse of electronic surveillance may be effectively 
counterbalanced by the demanding requirements for judicial approval. 
The application for a Hawaii wiretap intercept must include details of a 
particular crime, a description of the facilities or place where the intercept 
is to take place, a description of the type of communications sought to be 
intercepted, and "the identity or description of all persons, if known, 
committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted."47 This requirement that the applicatjon name all known 
perpetrators 'of the target offense has its Title III couni~rpart, b~ t the Title 
III provision requires only the naming of "the person, if known, 
committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted. "48 
In United States v. Donovan49 the government argued that this language 
required the naming of only the contemplated intercept's "principal 
target," who would be the subscriber or user of the target telephone, as 
contrasted with other known conspirators who were likely to converse with 
principal targets from non-targeted telephones. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and held in Donovan that the applicant must name 
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Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
and to be communicating from or to the target telephone In underscoring 
the importance of the naming requirement, the Court ~oi~ted ~ut that it 
triggers two other provisions of Title III: that the applIcatIOn dlsc~~se ~.II 
previous applications "involving any of the sam.e pers~ns ... specIfIed In 
the application";50 and that post-intercept notIce be served on persons 
named in the application.51 
The Donovan holding 'will apply with like force in Hawaii because 
Section 803-46( I) envisions the naming of "all persons" believed to be 
committing and talking about the offense under investigation. Although 
the legislative l:tistory of the Act contains no reference to this provis~on: it 
appears to have been drafted with the aim of resolving the vel~y ambIgUIty 
addressed in Donovan. There is, on the other hand, no reqUIrement that 
the prosecution investigate all potential users of the target telephone to 
determine if they are "committing the offense" and hence need to be 
named. Such a requirement, noted the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Kahn,52 would impose too heavy an investigative burden on the 
government. 
Applications for wiretap authorization must also contain fuII 
information relating to all known previous wiretap applications 
involving the same persons or telephones,53 facts indicating the necessary 
period of time for the intercept,54 and "a full and complete state~ent of 
facts as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tned and 
failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to 
be too dangerous." This last provi~ion, found in Section 803-46(1), has its 
Title III counterpart, which the Supreme Court has indicated is "designed 
to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional 
investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime."55 
Several decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the N in th Circui t ha ve 
held that concIusory allegations that other investigative procedures have 
failed or are unlikely to succeed will not satisfy this requirement: "[T]he 
affidavit, read in its entirety, must give a factual basis sufficient to show 
that ordinary investigative procedures have failed or will fail in the 
particular case at hand," observed Judge Sneed in United States v. 
Spagnuolo.56 More specifically, the application must demonstrate good 
faith efforts to identify the lawbreakers and to muster evidence to convict. 
"What is required is a showing that in the particular investigation normal 
investigative techniques employing a normal amount of resources have 
failed to make the Lase within a reasonable period of tirne."57 When other 
techniques have not been attempted the affidavit should set forth "an 
adequate factual history of the investigation and a description of .the 
criminal enterprise sufficient to enable the [court] to determIne, 
independently of an agent's assertions with respect to his or other agents' 
experiences, that ordinary investigative techniques very likely wiII not 
succeed or that their use will imperil life or in some other specific way be 




ultimate determination of compliance with this part of the statute will 
necessarily employ a standard of reasonableness, concluded the court. 
Following the explication of these guidelines the SPagnuolo court 
disapproved an application that contained only "an informant's 
description of gambling activities which transpire[d] telephonically," 
reasoning that approval of such a generalized assertion would "effectively 
deny the ... judge his statutory role."59 The court next sustained a second 
affidavit that met the test of good-faith exhaustion of normal.investigative 
procedures: 
Posing as a corrupt p.olice officer, [the agent] successfully 
infiltrated the gambling organization to its highest level, yet he 
was unable to identify all the participants in the operation or to 
accumulate sufficient evidence to support all the elements of the 
offense. His investigation also revealed that these suspects 
operated in a manner that defied detection by ordinary means. 
They operated telephonically and were extremely wary of police 
activity as evidenced by their use of code names and their pattern of 
changing telephones. Furthermore, his visual surveillance of the 
principals had been fruitless. 60 
The exhaustion requirement imposes a considerable burden on the police, 
but is consistent with the restrictive nature of the Act. 
A unique feature of the Hawaii legislation is its provision for an 
adversary hearing to test the sufficiency of the wiretap application. Section 
803-46(2) specifies that upon receipt of the application the "judge shall 
appoint an attorney to oppose the application." The Senate committee 
report states that this provision "is designed to ensure an informed j udicial 
decision on the probable cause requiremeht. "61 The statute provides detail 
regarding the nature of the contemplated hearing.: 
The appointed attorney shall be given at least twenty-four hour~ 
notice of the hearing and shall be served with copies of the 
application, proposed order, if any, and supporting documents 
with the notice. At the hearing, the attorney appointed may cross-
examine witnesses and present arguments in oppostion to the 
application. The affiant supporting the application shall be 
present at the hearing .... The designated circuit court may 
require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or 
documentary evidence under oath or affirmation in support of the 
application. A transcript of the hearing shall be made and kept 
with application and orders.62 
In recommending this adversary hearing' procedure; ~he Haw~ii 
Commission on Crime suggested that "[0 ]pposition by an attorney 
representing the public will provide the best possible ~rotection aga.inst 
'rubber stamping' by judges, or decisions based on a dIstorted one-SIded 
view of the evidence and arguments supporting an application."6!1 
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Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
commission observed th~t "[t]he attorney should have the right to cross-
examine the affiant supporting the application."64 
It seems clear that the opposition attorney, or "challenger," will 
function as a public advocate rather than as counsel for the accused, 
because he plainly cannot communicate with the accused. What, then, 
should be the function of the challenger? Applications for wiretap orders 
must persuade the court that there is ~robable ~ause to believe th.a~,(l) "an 
individual is committing, has commItted, or IS about to commIt one of 
the specified crimes; (2) "particular communications concerning that 
offense will be obtained through [the] interception"; (3) normal 
investigative procedures have failed or are unlikely to succeed; and (4) the 
telephone to be tapped is being used in connection with the crime, or by the 
person believed to be committing the crime.65 
This is a substantial burden,66 and the experience under Title III 
suggests that the prosecution will likely seek to meet it by p~esentin~, in 
affid;lvits, the results of police investigations and informauon obtamed 
from confidential informants whose reliability must be established but 
whose identity need not be revealed.67 The major question relating to the 
role of the challenger attorney would seem to be whether his challenge is 
limited to the facial sufficiency of the affidavits, which would essentially 
confine his role to legal argumentation, or whether an extrinsic 
investigative function would be appropriate. The Act and its legislative 
history shed little light on this matter. Section 803-46(2) requires that the 
adversary hearing be held i.n camera, and the House committee report notes 
that the hearing should "be held in secret in the judge's chambers to protect 
the confidentiality necessary to a successful wiretap. "68 
From this scant evidence it appears that the challenger's function is 
essentially limited to reading the affidavits, researching the probable cause 
precedents, cross-examining the affiant, and presenting legal arguments 
about the probable cause factors. Twenty-four hours is hardly adequate 
time in which to launch, much less complete, a street investigation. SucJ:t 
an investigation, moreover, would threaten the confidentiality of the 
proposed wiretap. The Act provides for the compensation of the challenger 
but not for the appointment or compensation of an investigator. 
Recognizing this substantial curtailment of the lawyer's tradit~o~al 
adversary fact-mustering function, opponents of the challenger provIsIOn 
have argued that the public privacy protection thus afforded is largely 
illusory and in any event substantially outweighed by the cost and delay 
. lb' d 69 factors involved. Concerns about secunty have a so een VOIce . 
On the other hand, the arguments in favor of the challenger are 
impressive. Courts are frequently accused of "rubber-stamping" ex parte 
arrest and search warrant applications, thereby eviscerating the 
constitutional warrant requirement. Contemplating even a limited 
adversary procedure, prosecutors can be expected to exercise care in the 
preparation of wiretap applications; judges, in turn, will be fully 
Page 10 






acquainted with arguable deficiencies in the prosecutorial assertions. The 
challenger becomes the public's watchdog in a necessarily secret process 
that should be of significant concern to citizens. 
The requirement of exhaustion of normal investigative procedures 
further underscores the utility of the challenger function. Cross-
examination of the affiant may reveal flaws in the prosecution's 
investigative efforts prior to the application. In addition, where the 
application is for a wiretap extension or is based on the results of another 
wiretap,7o the challenger may be able to pinpoint statutory violations in 
the earlier surveillance that preclude current authorization. The 
requirement that wiretap applications reveal all previous appqcations 
involving the same named targets or 'the same telephones, for example, 
may impose upon the court an obligation to determine the legality of 
earlier surveillances.7l Finally, in the event of an appeal from the denial of 
a wiretap application, the challenger becomes the logka) appellate 
adversary,72 A basic tenet of the Americanjustice process postulates that the 
adversary clash promotes better informed judicial decision making,73 and 
meaningful judicial control of police activity is the essence of the warrant 
requirement. Inclusion of a public adversary in this low visibility process 
raises security problems only to the extent that the challenger attorney, 
who is to be selected by the judge,74 disobeys his explicit instruction not to 
reveal his knowledge and thus commits a punishable contempt of court. 
Security arguments have traditionally been a favorite prosecutorial ploy 
in electronic eavesdropping cases. In a recent national security case, the 
United States favored an exception to the warrarit requirement because 
judges and their clerks and secretaries could not be trusted. The Supreme 
Court rejected the argument, noting that "[j]udges may be counted upon to 
be especially conscious of security requirements in national security 
cases. "75 The same can be said of court-appointed challengers in organized 
crime cases. The determination to issue a wiretap authorization is 
probably the most critical decision in the entire surveillance process, at 
least from the general public interest standpoint, because it distinguishes 
the not-so-innocent from the innocent on the basis of probable cause, an 
evidentiary standard by definition insufficient to sustain a conviction at a 
trial. Subsequent decisions proceed on the assumption that wiretap targets 
have been properly identified by application of the probable cause measure 
as suspected criminals. Hawaii's unique adversary hearing is a worthy 
experiment in the attempt to implement an important constitutional 
criterion. 
The probable cause r~quirement in the eavesdropping context does not 
differ quantitatively' from the familiar standard for the issuance of 
conventional search and arrest warrants. 76 Probable cause for a wiretap, the 
Supreme Court has reminded, "exists where the facts and circumstances 
within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably 









Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being 
committed."77 The Hawaii Constitution is explicit: "[N]o warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized or the communications sought to be intercepted."78 The courts' 












Contents of Wiretap Orders 
If the court makes the requisite probable cause findings and determines 
that other investigative procedures are inadequate, it may issue an order 
authorizing' interception "within the county in which- the court is 
sitting."80 The contents of such orders must meet the exacting 
specifications of Sections 803:-46(4), (5) and (6), which reflect the 
constitutional command of particularization in warrants. To begin with,' 
wiretap orders must contain: (1) the identity or description of all known 
persons' whose conversations are to be intercepted; (2) the nature and 
location of the targeted telephone facilities and the means of 
interception;81 (3) "[ a] particular descri ption of the type of communication; 
sought to be intercepted"82 and a statement of the related crime for which 
probable cause has been found; (4) the identity of the agency authorized to 
conduct the wiretap; and (5) the authorized time period of the intercept, 
"including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall 
automatically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained.' '83 
Section 803-46(5) specifies that no order shall permit wiretapping "for 
any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the 
authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days." This section also 
prescribes: 
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that 
the auth()rization to intercept shall be executed as soon as 
practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to miniinize the 
imerception of communications not otherwise subject' to 
interception . . . and shall terminate upon attainment of the 
authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days or in fifteen days 
in case of an extension . 
Finally, Section 803-46(6) directs that the order "shall require reports to be 
made to the court . . . showing what progress has been made toward 
achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued 
interception." The court is given discretion respecting the frequency with 
which sucb progr~ss reports shall be required. 
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of judicial direction and control of wiretap operations. In Berger v. New 
York,84 the· Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state eavesdropping 
statute mainly because if failed to require such specificity. The New York 
statute permitted two months of eavesdropping on a determination of 
probable cause to believe that evidence of crime would be thereby obtained, 
but it did not require that the court order set forth a particular crime or a 
description of the communications to be intercepted. The Court stressed 
these deficiencies: "[T]he statute's failure to describe with particularity 
the conversations sought gives the officer a roving commission to 'seize' 
any and all conveFsations."85 In addition, noted the Court, "authorization 
of eavesdropping for a two-month period is the equivalent of a series of 
intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable 
cause." The statute also did not require termination of an intercept "once 
the conversation sought is seized."86 For these reasons, the New York 
statute offended the particularity requirement, which is designed to 
prevent general searches and "the seizure of one thing under a warrant 
describing another."87 The Supreme Court summed up the purpose-of this 
requirement: "As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of 
the officer executing the warrant."88 
Title III was written to avoid the Berger pitfalls, and Sections 803-46(4), 
(5) and (6) track parallel provisions in Title III.89 In short, these provisions 
seek to minimize the wiretappers' discretion by requiring that court orders 
identify with some precision the conversations to be "seized," mandate 
reduction of monitoring of conversations not related to the probable cause 
factors, and enforce termination of monitoring as soon as the desired 
evidence has been obtained. 
The problem is that a certain amount of continuous monitoring of 
conversations is unavoidable, especially in the early days of an intercept. 
The size and membership of a criminal conspiracy, for example, maybe 
unknown. Patterns and categories of conversations may need to be 
established. Speakers must be identified. The subject matter of an 
apparently innoc.ent conversation may shift at any time to discussion of 
criminal operations.90 Criminal conspirators often speak in coded 
language.91 In consequence, federal wiretap agents have displayed a 
tendency to monitor all communications for the maximum period of 
authorization. After all, how is one to know whether a conversation is 
pertinent until he listens to it? And why should one suppose that two or 
three incriminating conversations will be enough to convict? Why not 
gather as much evidence as possible? The problem is compounded by the 
inherent vagueness of concepts such as "type of communication" and 
"attainment of the authorized objective." 
In Scott v. United States,92 the Supreme Court recently upheld a wiretap 
where federal agents intercepted all conversations which took place on a 
given telephone for an entire month, even though sixty percent of the 
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Contents of Wiretap Orders 
mlI1lmization of nonpertinent monitoring and termination upon 
attainment of the objective. Rejecting a challenge based on this apparent 
minimization failure, the Court reasoned that the need to ascertain the 
scope of a widespread narcotics conspiracy ju:.tified uninterrupted 
telephone monitoring. The Scott decision, which is discussed more fully in 
the next section of this article,93 is difficult to reconcile with Berger. It 
seems that Justice Rehnquist, who authored Scott, forgot ~hat the 
particularity requirement not only envisions esthetically satisfying 
wiretap warrants but has a functional purpose as well. In any event, the 
upshot of Scott and other federal court decisions sustaining 
undiscriminating wiretap monitoring is that the current vitality of Berger 
v. New York is open to serious question.94 
There is reason to believe that the Hawaii Supreme Court will more 
strictly scrutinize wiretap operations than has the Burger Court under 
Title III. The Hawaii court has declined to follow several recent Supreme 
Court decisions that have diluted fourth and fifth amendment 
protections,95 and on one occasion, in State v. Kaluna,96 has specifically 
held that the Hawaii Constitution places greater restrictions on the scope 
of searches than does the fourth amendment. Moreover, the Hawaii law is 
more restrictive, especially in the area of minimization, than is Title III. 
Although Section 803-46(5) requires that court orders direct minimization 
only in general terms, Subsections 803-46(5)(a) and (b) contain detailed 
instructions regarding the conduct of minimization efforts, which must 
include refraining from listening to privileged communications such as 
those between spouses or with attorneys, physicians or clergymen,,,7 and 
monitoring only "intermittently" conversations that appear unlikely to 
produce incriminating material.98 
There is no intermittent monitoring mandate in Title III, and this 
omission is dramatically highlighted by the continuous intercept 
validated in the Scott decision. Subsection 803-46(5 )(b) further clarifies the 
intermittent monitoring limitation by directing the wiretappers, in their 
determination whether or not a particular communication is likely to yield 
incriminating material, to consider the identity of the speakers, the nature 
of the offense, the hour and day of the conversation, the initial subject 
matter of the conversation, and the subject matter of previous 
conversations between the same speakers. Even these statutory guides to 
wiretap COl)duct, however, fall considerably short of the kind of impact 
that could be achieved by a court-ordered minimization instruction 
tapored to the facts of a particular case. 
The most effective means of curtailing the discretion inherent in wiretap 
operations isa court order that contains individualized instructions to 
guide the minimization and termination decisions.99 For minimization, 
the starting point would be the factors concerning intermittent 
monitoring found in Subsections 803-46(5 )(a) and (b). In addition, the size 
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would be the use to which a telephone is normally put. The Supreme Court 
in Scott pointed out that a public telephone, for example, would not justify 
as extensive a surveillance as would a telephol)e "located in the residence of 
a person who is thought to be the head of a major drug ring. "100 The model 
statute proposed by the Hawaii Commission on Crime would have 
permitted wiretapping only of conversations in which at least one speaker 
was named or described in the application and order. lol The Senate 
committe,(.' report mentioned that several committee members had voiced 
concern about the deletion of this restriction, and predicted "that judges 
issuing wiretap orders will restore this desirable limitation in appropriate 
cases to avoid possible constitutional problems in the operation of the 
wiretap law."102 
In United States v. Kahn,103 the Supreme Court held tliat, in the case of a 
conspiracy among one named subject and "others as yet unknown," the 
monitoring of conversations between unknown speakers is permissible. 
Rejecting an argument that such a result would confer unfettered 
discretion on the police, the Court stressed the minimization requirement 
and added that the court order in Kahn allowed only fifteen days of 
monitoring and required five-day progress reports. 104 
Although Hawaii's Section 803-46(5)(a) contemplates intermittent 
monitoring of any conversation, court orders should tolerate no more 
extensive interception than is necessary for reasonable investigation of a 
given criminal operation. For example, unless the application 
dem0nstrates cause to believe that the target conspiracy extends to persons 
other than those named, there is no constitutional justification for 
allowing monitoring of conversations of unknown speakers.105 
Assuming that a wiretap application demonstrates probable cause to 
believe that two or more named persons "and others unknown" are 
participating in a conspiracy to commit an offense, it would seem 
reasonable for a court order to permit total interception of conversati~ns 
between those named persons during the course of the surveillance. The 
order could also allow monitoring of conversations between a named 
target and an unknown or unnamed person, at least during the early days 
of the wiretap, to determine whether the unknown person is a 
conspirator. 106 It has been suggested that when conversations between a 
named target and an unnamed subject produce incriminating evidence, 
the prosecution should be required to seek an amendment to the original 
authorization, thereby enabling the court to ascertain whether probable 
cause exists to name the additional target. IQ7 Whether or not the original 
order should permit monitoring of calls between unnamed persons is best 
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature and size 
of the suspected conspiracy. 
Creative particularization of minimization criteria in a court order may 
be a difficult undertaking, but it seems better designed to produce 
constitutionally acceptable results than reliance on the judgment of 
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Contents of Wiretap Orders 
officers '~engaged in the often competItIve enterprise of ferreting out 
crime."108 The same analysis applies to the termination decision. 'Fhe 
federal experience has shown that mere recitation of the statutory' 
directions does not work. In any event, wiretap orders should always be 
drafted with the mandate of "particularly describing . . . the 
communications sought to be intercepted" in mind, and this mandate 
implicitly envisions judicially prescribed restraint with respect to 
extraneous interceptions and judicially imposed cessation of monitoring 
as soon as the desired evidence has been a~quired. 
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Court Supervision of Wiretaps 
To understand the need for effective, ongoing judicial supervision of 
eavesdropping operations, it is useful to contrast the execution of 
conventional search warrants. Awarrant authorizing the search of a home, 
for example, is exhausted when the search, however extensive, is 
completed. The officers empowered to execute the warrant are not 
permitted additional searches, even though the authorized search may have 
failed to produce the sough t-after evidence of criminali ty .109 There is hence 
no occasion for court supervision other than to require a report or "return" 
to the court regarding the results of the search. Since a wiretap operates 
over an extended period of time and involves a degree of uncertainty with 
respect to the nature of the conversations to be "seized," supervision is 
essential. 
Section 803-46(5 )'s outer limit of thirty days of monitoring is the same as 
that of Title II!. I IO This does not mean that every wiretap can lawfully run 
for thirty days, because the objective may be attained at any time and 
termination is then mandatory. Section 803-46(6) prescribes that wiretap 
orders shall mandate reports to the court that issued the order "showing 
what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized 
objective and the need for continued interception." 
Title III, by way of contrast, specifies only that the court "may" order the 
making of such reports. The reporting requirement is designed to facilitate 
the court's supervisory function, and the Hawaii Act further specifies that 
progress reports "shall be made at such intervals as the court may require." 
Under Title III, it has not been uncommon for federal judges to require 
reports at five-day intervals,I1I which would seem adequate to satisfy the 
need for a judicial decision on termination, assuming that the court is ever 
sensitive to the proper balance between the dual, competing purposes of 
the legislation. The reports should contain ample detail regarding the 
nature of the communications being intercepted, because conclusory 
reports would negate the judicial function. 
Periodic progress reports also enable the court to oversee the 
minimization efforts of the wiretap agents. In United States v. Kahn Justice 
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days "so that any possible abuses might be quickly discovered. and 
halted."1l2 In its more recent decision in Scott v. United States,ll3 however, 
the Supreme Court upheld a wiretap that was operated continuously for an 
entire month, even though the court order required minimization and the 
government conceded that the federal agents made no efforts to minimize. 
The Court said that the failure of the government agents to undertake 
good-faith efforts at minimization was not dispositive because a reviewing 
court should undertake "an objective assessment of the officer's actions in 
light of the facts and circumstances then known to him,"1l4 and upon such 
an assessment the Court decided that the interception of all the 
conversations was not unreasonable. 
On the question of reasonableness, the Court listed a number offactors 
contributing to decision. The percentage of nonincriminating or 
non pertinent conversations intercepted, while relevant, is not 
determinative because, as the Court observed, some telephone calls may be 
short in duration, some may be "one-time-only" calls, and some may be, 
ambiguous or involve the possibility of coded language. In such situations 
"agents can hardly be expected to know that the calls are not pertinent 
prior to their termination."115 In Scott sixty percent of the calls were 
considered nonpertinent. Moreover, suggested the Court, when the 
criminal object of the wiretap is a "widespread conspiracy" more extensive 
surveillance may be justified to ascertain its scope. Finally, noted the 
Court, it may be appropriate to view the entire surveillance: "During the 
early stages of surveillance the agents may be forced to intercept all calls to 
establish categories of non pertinent calls which will not be intercepted 
thereafter.' '116 
Applying these criteria, the Scott Court susta'ined the questioned 
wiretap, notwithstanding that the agents, who made no effort tominimize, 
concededly employed no criteria. The motivation and intent of the agents, 
concluded the Court, are not relevant on the question of the reasonableness 
of their conduct. In dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that Title III 
explicitly requires that the surveillance be conducted in such a way as to 
minimize the privacy invasion,II7 and that the Court's holding permitted 
wiretappers to flout the congressionally imposed duty for which the Court 
substituted its retrospective conjecture of what might have happened had 
the agents made the efforts required of them. Moreover, Brennan noted, the 
Scott result failed entirely to take into account the Court's earlier decision 
in United States v. Kahn,1l'8 which sanctioned the surveillance of persons 
not named in the wiretap order but which relied on the minimization 
requirement as a counterbalance. Brennan concluded, somewhat 
rhetorically: "This process of myopic, incremental denigration of Title 
Ill's safeguards raises the spectre that, as judicially 'enforced,' Title III may 
be vulnerable to constitutional attack for violation of Fourth Amendment 
standards, thus defeating the careful effort Congress made to avert that 
result."1l9 
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As suggested in the preceding section of this article, the Scott decision 
seems basically at odds with Berger v. New York. Although Berger decided 
only the facial invalidity of the New York wiretap statute, the reasoning in 
support of that decision was that the statute's failure to require 
particularity could result in the very kind of surveillance revealed in Scott. 
Moreover, Scott appears to neglect an essential principle of the Court's 
fourth amendment jurisprudence, that a search can never be vindicated by 
what it yields. Scott recognized the corollary principle that the permissible 
scope of a search is determined by viewing each seizure with reference to 
contemporaneous police knowledge, but applied it only in justification of 
nonpertinent interception. The Court simply assumed without discussion 
that the incriminating intercepts were lawful without reference to 
contemporaneous factors. This reasoning implies a "no-holds-barred" 
approach to conspiracy cases and an implicit devaluation of the warrant 
requirement. 
On the other hand, the unidentified villain in the Scott scenario appears 
to have been the authorizing judge, who received progress reports at five-
day intervals but failed to supervise the tap.120 The court was therefore 
equally to blame for the uninterrupted monitoring, and this factor may 
have influenced decision. In any event, the Scott wiretap would likely not 
be sustained in Hawaii,121 if only because of Section 803-46(5)'s 
intermittent monitoring limitation. The case certainly highlights the need 
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The, Suppression Remedy 
Section 803-46(7)(a) of the Act directs that all intercepted communications 
"shall, if p~ssible, be recorded on tape or wire orother comparable device" 
and shall, "[ i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order ... 
be made available to the court issuing such order and sealed under the 
court's directions."122 Section 803-46(7)(d) in turn prescribes that "[w]ithin 
a reasonable time but no later than ninety days after the termination of the 
period of an order or extensions thereof" the court shall effect the service of 
an inventory notice to all persons named in the order, all persons whose 
conversations were intercepted, and such other persons as to whom notice 
would be "in the interest of justice." 
Notice must include a statement of the period of interception and of 
whether or not during that period any communications' and any 
incriminating statements were intercepted. This notice requirement is 
mOTe demanding than that of Title III, which contains no explicit 
prescription concerning notice to persons not named in the court order but 
overheard in the wiretap. Such persons, conduded the U.S. Court Qf 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in its recent decision in United States v. 
Chun,l'!.3 are nonetheless entitled to notice if ~he prosecution intends to 
indict them. Under the above Hawaii provision, unnamed-but-overheard 
persons would be entitled to nOlice in any event. 
The notice .requirement imposes a lloublesome burden on the court 
beca,use of the difficulty inherent in identifying speakers in the wiretap 
tapes. The Chun court addressed this problem and held that the 
prosecution must identify or at least "classify all those whose 
conversations have been intercepted, and ... transmit this information to 
the judge" to facilitate the notification process. 12.j The Supreme Court 
explicitly approved this procedure in United States v. Donovan,125 and 
added that where the government chooses to identify intercepted persons, 
rather than classify, "the list must be complete."1'!.6 Persons served with 
inventory notice in Hawaii are then entitled, upon motion, to inspect the 
original application and court order, their own intercepted conversations, 
"and other evidence obtained as a result of the use of wiretap orders."127 
Section 803-46(8) provides that no evidence derived from intercepted 
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Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
communications shall be received in any trial or hearing unless each party 
has received inventory notice and discovery at least thirty days prior to the 
trial or hearing. Section 803-46(9) permits "any aggrieved person" to move 
to suppress the contents of intercepted communications and derivative 
evidence on the grounds that: "(i) The communication was unlawfully 
intercepted; (ii) The order of authorization or approval under which it was 
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) The interception was not made 
in conformity with the order of authorization or approval." 
The question of suppression of evid~nce has generated considerable case 
law under Title III, which contains a similar suppression remedy.128 The 
iirst issue concerns standing to move to suppress and that in turn,depends 
upon who is considered an "aggrieved person" under Section 803-46(9). 
Both acts define "aggrieved person" as "a person who was a party to any 
intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the 
interception was directed."129 The Supreme Court addressed the question 
of standing in the pre-Title III case of Alderman v. United States/!'o and 
decided that standing would be limited to persons whose conversations 
were overheard and persons whose premises were surveilled, whether or 
not they were present in the premises at the time of surveillance. Title III 
has been similarly construed, because its legislative history evidences an 
intent not to broaden conventional standing doctrine.i31 This doctrine 
denies the suppression remedy to persons whose only grievance is that 
illegally obtained evidence is used against them at the trial. 
Because of the similarity between the two acts, courts construing the 
Hawaii law will probably adopt the restrictive federal rule on standing.132 
One unresolved issue concerns the meaning of the phrase, "against whom 
the interception was directed," more specifically, whether this language 
was intended to confer standing upon individuals named in the 
application who cannot obtain standing under the other tests. The federal 
cases have not resolved this point, but it would seem that named targets are 
within the literal meaning and apparent intent of these words.133 
The principal suppression problem is the determination of which 
statutory violations require suppression and which do not. The Supreme 
Court has addressed this issue in three cases and has adopted a selective 
approach to suppression under Title III. In United States v. Giordano,134 
where the wiretap application had not been approved by the Attorney 
General or his designated assistant, as prescribed by the statute, the Court 
ordered suppression because of its belief that "Congress intended to 
require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory 
requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional 
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly 
calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device."135 
But in a companion case, United Statesv. Chavez,136 the Court refused to 
suppress even though the application, as in Giordano, falsely recited thata 
properly designated assistant had given approval. The factual distinction 
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justifying this difference in result was that in Chavez the Attorney General 
had in fact approved the application, although it did not recite his 
approval, whereas in Giordano no authorized person had given approval, 
recitations to the contrary notwithstanding. The upshot is that the 
communications in Chavez were not considered "unlawfully intercepted" 
under the first of the three above-mentioned suppression grounds, even 
though the Chavez applic'.ltion was at least in technical violation of the 
statute. 
The Giordano decision makes clear that Title Ill's suppression remedy 
is triggered not only by constitutional violations but also by transgressions 
of any s'tatutory provisions that playa "central role" in the regulatory 
scheme.l-37 This distinction received further attention in United States v. 
Donovan,138 where the Court found two statutory violations but declineq 
to suppress. In Donovan several known surveillance targets for whom 
probable cause existed were not named in the application, and several 
persons were not served with mandatory inventory notice because the 
prosecution had inadvertently failed to advise the court that their 
conversations had been intercepted. Citing Giordano and Chavez, the 
Court reiterated that suppression should be ordered only where the 
statutory provision that has been violated can be said to play a 
"substantive" or "central" role in the regulatory system. 139 The Court 
therefore decided that the Donovan wiretap application's failure to name 
persons required by tne statute to be named did not detract from the overall 
sufficiency of the application. Indeed, observed the Court, nothing in Title 
Ill's legislative history suggests that its broad identification requirement 
was intended to play "a central, or even functional, role in guarding 
against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance. "140 
A similar result was reached on the failure to supply inventory 
notice: "[W]e do not think that postintercept notice was intended to serve 
as an independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure."141 It trus 
appears that whether or not the violation of a particular appliG,j'lon 
provision'willlead to suppression of evidence depends, to sor:ne extent, on 
whether or not the order would have issued in the first place had the, 
violation not been committed. 
Justice Powell's analysis in Donovan on the naming violation, although 
perhaps flawed, sheds light on how the Court might eye other statutory 
violations in the suppression context. He stresses initially the critical 
preconditions to court approval of wiretap applications, including the 
exhaustion of normal investigative techniques and the probable cause 
'findings that a specific person is committing a specific offense using a 
specific telephone. The intercept order may issue, notes Powell, only if 
these preconditions are met, "and the failure to name additional targets in 
no way detracts from the sufficiency of those factors."142 He concludes that 
the naming of "additional targets would [not] have precluded judicial 
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in Donovan is that this information might very well have precluded court 
approval because a "history of recent applications would at the least cause 
a judge to consider whether the application before him was an attemptto 
circumvent the restrictive rulings of another judge or to continue an 
unjustified invasion of privacy."144 
Given the requirement of disclosure of previous applications involving 
any of the same named targets, Marshall's point is well taken. The Court's 
opinion seems to assume, as the government argued, that the named 
persons were the prjncipal targets and that the persons who should have 
been named were simply incidental suspects. As if in recognition of this 
difficulty, the Court observed that there was no showing that the 
application's omission of the additional targets was intentionally 
contrived for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the issuing 
judge. "If such a showing had been made, we would have a different 
case."145 The problem is that it is virtually impossible to ascertain which 
persons might have been the principal targets of a given surveillance 
except by reliance on governmental assertions. It is therefore arguable that 
the Donovan result on the application point is at odds with the very 
criterion that the Court purported to employ. 
The implications of the Giordano, Chavez, and Donovan opinions are 
numerous. Title Ill's suppression remedy reaches purely statutory as well 
as constitutional violations, yet the Court seemed to stres,s that the 
Donovan derelictions were not of constitutional dimension. The general 
criterion for suppression is the centrality of a particular provision in the 
overall regulatory system, and that in turn seems to depend on whether the 
provision was intended to restrain wiretapping procedures. The probable 
cause factors and the requirement of exhaustion of conventional 
investigative techniques appear to meet this standard,146 but post-intercept 
procedures seem less important. Finally, the degree to which a statutory 
violation is considered intentional, rather than inadvertent, may tip the 
suppression balance in any case. The Court expressly declined in Donovan 
to consider how it would have decided the notice violation had the 
government's omission been deliberate, or if there had been a showing of 
prejudice. 147 
The Court has not spoken to suppression fora minimization failure, but 
has suggested in the Scott case tl:at the good faith of the wiretappers, 
although not relevant to decision on the adequacy of their minimization 
efforts, may have bearing in determining the exclusion remedy.148 The 
Court may thus adopt the "double standard" appro~ch developed by 
several courts that distinguish between outright defiance of the 
minimization requirement, which calls for total exclusion, and good faith 
but inadequate minimization efforts, which result in suppression of only 
the excessive monitoring. 149 
The suppression issue iriHawaii is further complicated by the fact that, 
although both Title III and Section 803-46(9) provide for suppression 
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motions by aggrieved persons, Title III contains a provision, not found in 
the Hawaii legislation, flatly prohibiting the receipt in evidence of any 
intercepted communication or derivative evidence "if the disclosure ofthat 
information would be in violation [of the statute]."150 The Supreme Court 
has said that this provision merely implements the suppression remedy,151 
although Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Chavez case, chided the 
majority for its selective suppression approach in the face of such an 
unambiguous directive: With this background, it may be that the Hawaii 
Act omitted this provision as surplusage. The House committee report 
simply mentions that "[e]vidence obtained as the result of an illegal 
wiretap would be excluded."152 
The Hawaii Supreme Court will likely be influenced by a number of 
factors when it confronts suppression issues under the new law. The 
Giordano-Chavez-Donovan analysis may commend itself, but the Hawaii 
court has been more faithful to the principle of exclusion than has its 
federal counterpart. The Burger Court has deprecated the exclusionary 
rule as an ineffective deterrent to police misconduct,153 whereas th~ Hawaii 
court has s tressed the im pera ti ve of judicial integri ty by observing recentl y 
that "it is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the lawbreaking police 
officer [by a failure to suppress]."154 
On the other hand, the principal characteristic of the wiretap law is 
judicial authorization and supervision, and judicial mistakes presumably 
require no greater deterrence than an appellate admonition. Another factor, 
seldom expressed, is that judges often appear to strain to avoid reversing 
the convictions of organized criminals, who are the intended targets of the 
wiretap laws. In '(he final analysis, the balance to be struck is between 
effective crime control and individual privacy rights. The Hawaii Act 
attempts a proper accommodation of these competing values, and wis~ly 
envisions reappraisal after six years of experience with 'a highly 
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IHaw. Rev. Stat. §§ 803-41 to 803-50 
(Supp. 1978). 
2Act Relating. to Electronic 
Eavesdropping, Pub. L. No. 218, § ](2) 
(1978). The quoted language is identical to 
the congressional finding set forth in the 
preamble to Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 211 
(1968), and reaffirmed by the National 
Commission for [he Review of Federal and 
State Laws Relating to Electronic 
Surveillance in its report, Electronic 
Surveillance (1976). For a contrary view of 
the effectiveness of electronic surveillance 
against organized crilf,e, see H. Schwanz, 
Taps, Bugs, andFooling the People (l 977). 
3Act Relating to Electronic 
Eavesdropping, Pub. L. No. 218, § 1(3) 
(1978). 
4Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-42 (Supp. 1978) 
(class C felony punishable by five years 
imprisonment). 
51 d. §§ 803-42(2)( d), 803-44. 
61d. §803-46(1)(b). 
71d. §803-46(2) & (3). 
80rders granting motions to suppress 
wiretap evidence are also appealable, id. § 
803-46(9)(b). 
91d. § 803-46(5). 
!Old. § 803-46(5) & (6). 
IIld. § 803-46(7)(a). 
121 d. § 803-46(7)( d). 
131d. § 803-46(9)(a). 
HId. § 803-48. 
15Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-50 (Supp. 1978). 
1618 U.S.c. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1976). 
17388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
18389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
19The Berger decision is discussed in 
greater detail at pp. 14- I 5 infra. 
2°This holding overruled Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which 
ex.empted non-trespassory surveillances 
from constitutional requirements. 
21 389 U.S. at 351, 356-59. 
22389 U.S. at 354-56. 
23H.S.C.R. No. 605-78, 9th Legis., 2d Sess. 
I (1978). 
24"Bugging," which is the interception of 
an "oral communication" as defined in 
section 803-41 (2), is proscribed in section 
803-42. In addition, sections 803-44, and 
803-46 ai.Hhorize the interception only of 
"wire communications" as defined in 
section 803-41 (1). Section 803-42(2)( c) 
prohibits the installation of a bugging 
device in any private place "without 
consent of the person or persons entitled to 
privacy therein." 
25Hawaii Commission on Crime, 
Wiretapping: A Report to the Hawaii State 
Legislature 101-03 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as HCC Wiretap Report). This report 
contains a model wiretap statute that 




'26See, e.g., United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 
2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 
2231 (1978); In re Application of United 
States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); 
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"Yes," 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1977). 
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description of wiretap methodology and 
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281d. at 102-03; see United States V. Ford, 
553 F.2d 146, 152 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
29See pp. 14-17 infra. 
30See also United States V. Volpe, 430 F. 
Supp. 931, 936 (D. Conn. 1977) (court 
authorized a bug because the suspect's use 
of "total telephone service" made it 
impossible to monitor calls received on his 
telephone). 
3IH.S.C.R. No. 605-78, 9th Legis., 2dSess. 
2 (1978). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976). 
33Surveillance with consent of one of the 
parties to the communication apparently 
does not require court.approval, see Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 803-42(2)(c) (Supp. 1978); see 
also United States, V. White, 401 U.S. 745 
(1971); State V. Roy, 54 Haw. 513, 510 P.2d 
1066 (1973). 
.34Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(2) (Supp. 
1978). The challenger provision is 
discussed more fully at pp. 9-11 infra. 
35United States V. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 
515 (1974). 
36Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-44 (Supp. 1978). 
37H.S.C.R. No. 605-78, 9th Legis., 2d Sess. 
2-3 (1978). The Senate committee report is 
to the same effect, S.S.C.R. No. 983-78, 9th 
Legis., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). In addition, HCC 
Wiretap Report lQ8 notes that 
"[w]iretapping is designed for infrequent 
use in extraordinary situations so that 
requiring the applicant to appear in 
person when not absent from the State or 
incapacitated should not he an undue 
burden." The statu tory language 
implementing this intent merely says that 
Footnotes 
the attorney general or' the county 
prosecuting attorney "may make 
application." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-44 
(Supp. 1978). This section should be read, 
in light of Title III, which authorizes state 
wiretap legislation by providing in 18 
U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976) that designated 
state officials "may apply" to state courts 
for wiretap orders. In United States V. 
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 777 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973), the court held 
that section 2516(2) did not require the 
personal appearance of the principal 
prosecuting attorney before the state judge, 
but observed: "The Act of course does not 
preclude a state from requiring its 
principal prosecuting officers to appear 
personally before the issuing judge." It 
appears from the legislative history that 
Hawaii has done just that. 
38416 U.S. 505 (1974). 
3918 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). 
40416 U.S. at 515-16,523. 
41J8 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976). 
42Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-44 (Supp. J978). 
The Act not only disaliows wiretapping in 
misdemeanor cases, but also prohibits rhe 
receipt of wiretap evidence "in support of 
any misdemeanor charge," id. § 803-45(6). 
43H.S.C.R.No. 605-78, 9th Legis., 2d Sess. 
2 (1978). 
HHaw. Rev. Stat. § 803-41(8) (Supp. 
1978). It is unclear why the Legislature 
eschewed the definition of "organized 
crime" contained in Hawaii's organized 
crime legislation, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 842-1 
(1976): "any combination or conspiracy to 
engage in criminal activity as a significant 
source of income or livelihood .. " ." 
45HCC Wiretap Report 107. 
46Hawaii Crime Commission, I 
Organized Crime in Hawaii 2-3 (1978). 
47Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(I)(b) (Supp. 
1978). 
48 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 )(b)(iv) (1976). 
49429 U.S. 413 (i977). The Donovan case is 
discussed in the section dealing with 
evidence suppression, pp. 23-24 infra. 
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disclosure requirement is found in Haw. 
Rev: Stal. § 803-46(1 )(f) (Supp. 1978). 
51429 U.S. at 425-26 n.14. 
52415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
53Haw. Rev. Stal. § 803-46(1 )(f) (Supp. 
1978), requiring "[a] full and complete 
statement of the facts' concerning all 
previous applications known to the 
individual authorizing and making the 
application, made to any court for 
authorization to intercept . . . ",ire 
communications il~volving any of the 
same persons, faci Ii ties or places .... " 
(emphasis added). This provision differs 
from its Tille III counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(l)(e) (1976), in that it omits from the 
divulgence requirement previous 
applications to intercept "oral 
communications." This omission is 
probably attributable to an apparent effort 
to effect the bugging proscription by 
consistently deleting the words ('oral 
communication" throughout the 
authorization provisions. If so, the 
provision mistakenly exempts from the 
divulgence requirement prior' federal 
bugging applications, which cannot be 
rationally distinguished from prior federal 
wiretap applications which, if known to 
the state prosecutor, are apparently 
incI uded. C f. U ni ted States v. Bellos!, 50 I 
F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
54Haw. Rev. Stal. § 803-46(1 )(e) (Supp. 
1978). 
55United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 
n.12 (1974). 
56549 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1977). 
571d. 
5ald. 
591d. at 71 I. 
6°ld.; accord, United States v. Feldman, 
535 F.2d I I 75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 940 (1976). 
61S.S.C.R. No. 983-78, 9th Legis., 2d Ses·s. 
3 (1978). 
62Haw. Rev. Stal. ~ 803-46(2) (Supp. 
1978). 
63HCC Wiretap Report 110. The 
challenger provision was proposed by 
Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
University of Hawaii Law Professor Jon 
Van Dyke, see Honolulu Star-Bulletin 
Nov. 23, 1977, at 2, col. 4-5. Adversar; 
procedure for wiretap authorization is also 
recommended in Abram, Foreword to H. 
Schwartz, Taps, Bugs, and Fooling the 
People 4 (1977). 
64HCC Wiretap Report I I l. 
65Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(3) (Supp. 
1978). 
66See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 539 
F.2d 181, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. deni'ed,. 
429 U.S. 1061 (1977); but cf. United States 
v. Kirk, 534 F.2dI262, 1274 (8th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 433 U.S. ~07 (1977) (21 day 
time lapse between prosecution's 
accumulation of facts and court's issuance 
of order). 
67McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); 
United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); 
State v. Delaney, 58 Haw. 19,563 P.2d 990 
(1977). 
6aH.S.c.R. No. 605-78, 9th Legis., 2d Sess. 
3 (1978). 
69The challenger provision has been 
attacked by several Hawaii prosecutors 
who maintain that they will not seek state 
wiretaps until this provision is removed 
from the law. Honolulu Advertiser, ]uly 
29, 1978, at I, col. 2-5. 
7°"Piggyback" laps art' common in 
federal narcotics and gambling 
investigations, see, e.g., United States v. 
Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Joseph v. United States, 
423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Moore, 
513 F.2d485 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States 
v. O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d 
Cir.), art. dmied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972). 
7JThe appropriateness of such an inquiry 
was suggested in United States v. Bellosi 
501 F.2d 833, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Th~ 
function of challenging prior state 
wiretaps would presumably be a limited 
one: the previous cOurt order could be 
teSl<.'d for facial validity, but to look behind 
it would unnecessarily duplicate the 
Page 28 
previous challenger's efforts. Only post-
authorization flaws in the prior tap would 
merit the full attention of the' new 
challenger. Prior federal taps, on the other 
hand, might warrant more extensive 
scrutiny. If the adversary hearing is to 
provide a meaningful safeguard, it seems 
worthwhile to allow a suppression remedy 
at the only time when its use may prevent 
future illegal invasions of privacy. 
72Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(2) (Supp. 
1978): "If an interlocutory appeal is taken 
by the State from the denial of an 
application, the appointed attorney shall 
be retained to answer the appeal or another 
attorney shall be appointed for the 
appeal." Because the result of an 
interlocutory appeal is likely, as a practical 
matter, to settle definitively those issues 
raised regarding the legality of the 
application, the appellate challenger, who 
has no federal counterpart, has a weighty 
obligation to serve his absen t "client" as 
well as to protect the public interest. 
73Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 
183-84 (1969). 
74Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(2) (Supp. 1978) 
provides that the challenger "shall be 
appointed and compensated in the same 
manner as attorneys are appointed to 
represent indigent criminal defendants." 
75United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). 
76See, e.g., United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 
522, 530 (2d CiL), cert. denied sub nom. 
Quinn v. United States, 433 U.S. 910 
(1977); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 
478, 481 (3d Cir. 197'4), cert.denied" 420 
U.S. 955 (1975). 
77Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 
(1967). 
78Haw. Const. Art. I, § 5. The 
"communications" clause was intended to 
sub.iect electronic surveillance to the 
warrant req~irement, see II Proceedings of 
the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii 
of 1968 at 4-9 (1972). 
79See gen~rall)' State v. Yaw, 572 P.2cI 856 
(Haw. 1977); State v. Kalai, 56 Haw. 366, 
Footnotes 
537 P.2d 8 (1975); State v. Davenport, 55 
Haw. 90, 92-93, 516 P.2d 65, 68-69 (1973); 
State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 553-55, 
512 P.2d 551, 552-53 (1973); State v. 
Texeira, 50 Haw. 138,433 P.2d593 (1967). 
BOHaw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(3) (Supp. 
1978). 
all d. § 803-46(3) further specifies: "If the 
order allows physical entry to accompFsh 
the interception, the issuing judge shall 
find that the interception could not be 
accomplished by means other than 
physical entry." As pointed out at p. 4 
supra, it is unlikely that installation of 
wiretaps will require the entry of private 
premises, a prediction bolstered by the fact 
that every reported federal case which ruled 
on the issue did so in the context of 
bugging. United States v. Dalia, 426 F. 
Supp. 862 (D.N.]. 1977), afl'd, 575 F.2d 
1344 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 24 Crim. 
L. Rep. 4002 (1978); United States v. 
Finazzo, 429 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mich. 
1977); United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 
931 (D. Conn. 1977); United States v. 
London, 424 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1976), 
a/I'd sub nom. United States v. Clerkley, 
556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 
sub nom. London v. United States, 98 S. 
Ct. 2830 (1978); cases cited note 26 supra. 
The extensive case law on the propriety of 
breaking and entering to install bugs 
results from Title Ill's silence on the point. 
a2Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(4)(c) (Supp. 
1978); cf. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 
43, 45 (5th Cir. 1976) (specificity 
requirement met by court order to wiretap 
"any and all converssations having 
discussions related to or concerning sale, 
possession, smuggling, or unauthorized 
trafficking in narcotics and dangerous 
drugs"); United States v. Ripka, 349 F. 
Supp. 539,542 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a/I'd mem., 
480 F.2cI 919, 49] F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(particularity requirement satisfied by 
order to intercept conversations "relating 
to the offenses of bookmaking and 
conspiracy" ). 
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B4388 u.s. 41 (1967). 
B5Id. at 59. 
B6Id. at 59-60. 
B7Id. at 58. 
BBld. 
B918 U:S.C. § 2518(4), (5) & (6) (1976). 
90See, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F. 
Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 478 F.2d 
494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
920 (1974) (a 45 page transcript of one 
intercepted conversation contained two 
pages of incriminating conversation in the 
middle). 
9lSee, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 
F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Joseph v. United States, 423 U.S. 858 (1975) 
(code words "tires" for narcotics and "shoe 
salesman" for heroin supplier); United 
States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(code words "christmas present" for 
heroin, "chess game" for narcotics 
exchange and "four room house with two 
stories" for four kilograms of heroin cut 
twice); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972) 
(code words "a day at the races" to denote a 
drug shipment). 
9298 S. Ct. 1717 (1978). 
93See pp. 19-20 infra. 
94Scott v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 
1728 (1978) (Brennan, ]., dissenting). 
95State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 
51 (1974), disapproving the result in 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 
(1973); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 
P.2d 657 (1971), refusing to follow Harris 
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (197l). 
9655 Haw. 361, 520 P. 2d 51 (1974). 
97Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(5)(a)(ii) (Supp. 
1978): "Privileged conversations, 
including those between a person and his 
spouse, attorney, physician, or clergyman, 
shall not be intercepted unless both parties 
to the conversation are named or described 
in the wiretap application and order." In 
contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1976) 
provides merely that "[n]o otherwise 
privileged wire or oral communication 
intercepted ... [under] this chapter shall 
lose its privileged character." United States 
- ----- -~-~~-,-~- ----
Hawaii's Wiretap Law 
v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974), approved the 
interception of conversations between a 
named target and his wife where the order 
referred to conspirators "as yet unknown." 
The Kahn Court did not discuss the 
privilege point, which had been 
adjudicated in the lower courts, United 
States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194-95 (7th 
Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 
143 (1974). See generally Note, Post-
Authorization ProbLems in the Use of 
Wiretaps: Minimization, Amendment, 
Sealing, and Inventories, 61 Cornell L. 
Rev. 92, 115-19 (1975). 
9BAccording to H.S.C.R. No. 605-78, 9th 
Legis., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), the provision for 
intermittent monitoring was intended "to 
minimize invasion of privacy while at the 
same time allowing law enforcement 
officers to maintain reas~nable 
surveillance." The practice of spot 
checking conversations is endorsed in 
Note, Minimization of Wire Interception: 
Presearch GuideLines and Postsearch 
Remedies, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1411 (1974), and 
the need for intermittent monitoring is 
suggested in United States v. LaGorga, 336 
F. Supp. 190, 197 (W.D. Pa 1971), where the 
court notes that it is "rather common thata 
telephone conversation initially between 
two children will later develop into a 
discussion between adults." 
99United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838,852 
(3d Cir. 1976) ("the better practice may be 
to give detailed instructions in each order 
whenever practicable for minimization"); 
see, e.g., United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 
146, 149 n.ll (D.C.Cir. 1977) (monitoring 
permitted only from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 
a.m.); United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 
1132, 1135 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 
U.S. 905 (1977) (no monitoring after 7:30 
p.m.); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 
(2d cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 
(1975) (interception limited to 
communications of one named subject 
"with co-conspirators, accomplices and 
agents"); United States v. George, 465 F.2d 
772 (6th Cir. 1972) (monitoring permitted 
only when named subject "is using the 
Page 30 
above-described pay telephone"). The 
order should be written, United States v. 
Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45-46 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Joseph v. United States, 
423 U.S. 858 (1975). 
loog8 S. Ct. at 1725. 
10lHCC Wiretap Report 113, 144. 
102S.S.C.R. No. 983-78, 9th Legis., 2d Sess. 
4 (1978). 
103415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
104Id. at 154. 
105ef. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361,520 
P.2d 51 (1974) (scope of search must be 
strictly tied to and justified by the 
circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible). 
106See United States v. Losing, 539 F.2d 
1174, 1180 (8th Cir. 1976), after remand, 
560 F.2d 906, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 
(1977); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 
29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert.denied sub nom., 
Joseph v. United States,' 423 U.;S. 858 
(1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 
867, 874 (7th Cir. 1975). 
107Note, Post-Authorization ProbLems in 
the Use of Wiretaps: Minimization) 
Amendment, SeaLing and Inventories, 61 
Cornell L. Rev. 92 (1975); Note, 
Minimization of Wire Interception: 
Presearch GuideLines and Postsearch 
Remedies, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1411 (1974). See 
the court order in United States v. O'Neill, 
497 F.2d 1020, 1022 (6th Cir. 1974). The 
importance of the naming provision as a 
statutory "trigger" is discussed at p. 8 
supra and pp. 23-24 infra. 
10BJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
14 (1948). 
1091 J. Varon, Searches, Seizures and 
Immur..tties 536 (2d ed. 1974). 
110 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). United 
States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 773-74 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973), 
held that the Berger requirements for 
limited duration of wiretaps are met by the 
combined statutory provisions of 18 U .S.C. 
§ 25i8(1)(f), (4)(e) & (5) (1976), which are 
the equivalents of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-
46(1)(g), (4)(e) & (5) (Supp. 197~). 
Footnotes 
IIIE.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 
U.S.143 (1974); United States v. Chavez, 
533 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Bynum, 
475 F.2d ~32 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States 
v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976), 
afi'd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The 
reports should be in writing, United States 
v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 194 (W.D. 
Pa. 1971). 
112415 U.S. 143, 154 (1974). 
11398 S. Ct.. 1717 (1978). 
114Id. at 1723. For a discussion of this 
"contemporaneous rule" see Note, 
Minimization of Wire Interception: 
Presearch GuideLines and Postsearch 
Remedies, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1411 (1974); 
Note, lVIinimization: In Search of 
Standards, 8 Suffolk L. Rev. 60 (1973). 
11598 S. Ct. at 17'25. 
llfild. For examples of how such 
categorization has been accomplished, see 
Note, Post-Authorization ProbLems in the 
Use of Wiretaps: Minimization) 
Amendment, SeaLing, and Inventories, 61 
Cornell L. Rev. 92,114 nn.l05 & 106(1975), 
citing United States v. Falcone, 364 F. 
Supp. 877 (D.N.]. 1973), afI'd mem., 500 
F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974),and United States 
v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, afi'd sub 
nom. United States v Giordano, 469 F.2d 
522 (4th Cir. 1972), afi'd, 416 U.S. 505 
( 1974). 
11798 S. Ct. at 1726-27, citing 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(5) (1976). 
1IB415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
11998 S. Ct. at 1728-29. 
12°Id. at 1720. Several courts have 
appraised the factor of judkial supervision 
in determining whether there has been a 
good faith attempt at minimization, 
United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 
29, 44-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Joseph v. United States, 423 U.S. 858 
(1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 
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Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 158 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Lewis v. United States, 
423 U.S. 996 (1975) (supervision relevant to 
termination question); see generally Note, 
Minimization and the Fourth 
Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861 (1974). 
121See pp. 14-15 supra. 
12218 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976) is to the 
same effect; see also Note, Judicial Sealing 
of Tape Recordings Under Title III - A 
Need for Clarification, 15 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 89 (1977). 
123503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974). 
124Id. at 540. 
125429 U.S. 413, 430-31 (1977). 
126Id. at 432. 
127Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-46(5)(d) (Supp. 
1978); in contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) 
(1976) relegates inspection to the court's 
discretion. 
128 18 U.S.C.§ 2518(10)(a) (1976). 
129Id. § 2510(11); Haw. Rev. ·Stat. § 803-
41(9) (Supp. 1978). 
13°394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
131S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code Congo 
& Ad. News 2112, 2179-80, 2185. In United 
States V. King, 478 F.2d 494, 506 (9th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974), 
standing to suppress was extended to one 
Maack who, although not a party to a 
conversation, had sent a telephonic 
message and received a reply through an 
agent. Th;p. interception of those messages, 
concluded the court, "invaded [his 
privacy] to the same extent as if he had 
taken the phone in hand and spoken on 
the line himself." The "Maack" rule does 
not apply to one merely referred to in 
others' conversations, Light V. United 
States, 529 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1976). 
The U.S. Court 6f Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has reasoned that standing to 
litigate minimization violations should be 
accorded only to telephone subscribers, 
United States V. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 526 (2d 
Oir.), cert. denied sub nom. Quinn V. 
United States, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); United 
States V. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. 
-~----:'-~,.,.-~--.,..,....,..----'-'---'-~ 
o 
Ha'waii's Wiretap Law 
denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972), but the 
Supreme Court appears to have rejected 
this limitation in Scott V. United States, 98 
S. Ct. 1717,1722 n.lO (1978), by accepting 
the government's concession that the 
minimization challenge could be pressed 
by one who "was a party to some non-
narcotics related calls." It may be necessary 
to distinguish between standing to litigate 
the minimization point and standing to 
suppress particular intercepts, see United 
States V. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 197 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), because the minimization inquiry 
requires appraisal of "the totality of the 
agents' conduct," whereas suppression, in 
the minimization context, should 
arguably be limited to those conversations 
as to which a particular movant IS 
aggrieved. 
Courts are also split on whether a 
defendant can challenge a wiretap on 
which he was overheard by asserting that 
the wiretap deri ved from a prior, illegal tap 
as to which he lacks standing, compare 
United States V. Wright, 524 F.2d 1100, 
1102 (2d Cir. 1975), and United States V. 
Abramson, 553 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) (no 
suppression), with People v. Amsden, 82 
Misc. 2d 91, 368 N.Y.S.2d433, 436 (Sup. Ct. 
1975), and Bell V. Maryland, 22 Md. App. 
496, 323 A.2d 677,679 (1974), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 1003 (1975) (suppression). 
132The question of standing to suppress 
the fruits of conventional searches and 
seizures has not been settled in Hawaii, see 
State V. Dias, 52 Haw. 100, 105, 470 P.2d 
510,513 (1970); however, Haw. R. PenalP. 
41(e), which governs coot-::ntional search 
and seizure su ppression motions, does not 
define "aggrieved person," whereas the 
state wiretap law does provide a definition 
that is identical to that of Title III. See note 
129 supra. 
133United Slates v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 179 
n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
134416 U.S. 505 (1974). 
135Id. at 527. 
136416 U.S. 562 (1974). 
Page 32 
137416 U.S. at 528. 
138429 U.S. 413 (1977). 
139Id. at 434. 
14°Id. at 437. 
141Id. at 439; cf. State v, Stachler, 570 P.2d 
1323,1330 (Haw. 1977) (no suppression for 
failure to comply with convention<li search 
and seizure inventory notice requirement 
in absence of prejudice); see also the post-
Donovan cases of United States V. 
Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1977) (no 
suppression for failure to notify issuing 
judge of identities of persons overheard); 
and United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d 
Cir.), cert.denied sub nom. Quinn v. 
United States, 433 U.S. 910 (1977) (no 
suppression for failure to comply with 
requirement of 90-day inventory notice to 
named target). 
The decisions have not ordered 
suppression when judges fail immediately 
to seal wiretap recordings delivered by the 
prosecution, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(8)(a) (1976), which is the equivalent 
of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803"46(7)(a) (Supp. 
1978). United Slates V. Angelini, 565 F.2d 
469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 
1487 (1978) (delays of 9, 26, 38 days in 
sealing three wiretaps); United Slates v. 
Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Quinn V. United States, 433 U.S. 
910 (1977) (6 day delay); United States v. 
Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 948 (1972) (13 day delay); United 
States V. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 851 
(S.D. N.Y. 1976), a/I'd mem., 553 F.2d 94 
(2d Cir. 1977) (24 and 42 day delays). 
142429 U.S. at 435. 
143Id. at 436. 
144ld. at 448. 
145Id. Cj,t 436 n.23. 
146United States V. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 
705,711 (9th Cir. 1977) (failure to exhaust 
normal investigative techniques requires 
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